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INTRODUCTION 
It took a long time to become aware of the decline. The 
principal factors were internal and human, and therefore 
avoidable: .  . . entrepeneurship had become flabby; growth 
industries and new technology were not pursued with suf­
ficient vigor; technical education and science were lagging; 
and the government-business relationship was not one of 
mutual support.1 
The above quote could be easily applied to the realm of present-
day American business, yet the words are an economic historian's obser­
vations on the causes of Britain's climacteric which occurred more than 
one hundred years ago. Public reaction to the plight of Britain's 
industries was forty years too late since concern was not aroused 
until after World War I . Hopefully, the same time lag will not occur 
in the United States where American industry now grapples with many of 
the same issues which plagued British industries over a century ago. 
In analyzing American business today, in the perspective of 
history, the danger signals of decline seem obvious: high interest 
rates are prohibiting industrial expansion. United States capital re­
investment in new technology is minimal compared to other advanced 
industrial nations, the quality of American science and mathematics 
education is of concern, and the United States government is seen as a 
restrictive regulator by many American businessmen. The causes of 
these problems affl icting American industries are varied, but very 
often American managers are blamed. Some individuals believe that at 
least f ifth percent of business problems are due to management 
factors:^ simply put, bad managers. 
1 
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The formal education of today's business managers does not ade­
quately prepare the new professional for his role "as the change agent 
in a business society that the United States, for better or worse, 
is.Universities are alleged to be centers of training rather than 
centers of learning. This failure to nurture the creative knowledge 
within the individual is the root cause of the American managerial cri­
sis. Imagination, intuition, and the need to review how human beings 
learn and invent must be implanted within the philosophy of management 
education.^ If American industries are to alleviate their problems, 
i t must be understood "that in an ultimate sense, the problems are 
problems of practical philosophy and .  . . philosophy is everyone's 
business. 
This awareness of the importance of philosophy, not a specific 
technique, is responsible for the success of Japanese management. 
Managerial methods in Japan are in many ways of American origin. 
For example, the concept of stable employment was advocated 
by Max Weber in his famous theory of bureaucracy. The ideas 
of organizational family, employee participation, group 
management, and job enrichment were advocated by such 
American scholars as Chris Argyris, Peter Drucker, Fred 
Herzberg, Rensis Likert and Douglas McGregor. The Japanese 
borrowed such concepts and adapted them to their culture.® 
American managers hope that combining American business techniques with 
Japanese cultural philosophies will result in better management.^ 
This explains the keen interest American managers have exhibited in 
recent years toward understanding the successful Japanese style. 
Specifically, they wish to know which aspects of Japanese management 
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can be implemented within their own firms to create a more viable and 
productive organization. 
In l ine with that goal, the purpose of this paper is to discuss 
the major principles of Japanese managerial style which can be, and 
have been, exported to the United States. The "lessons" for the 
American manager, as outlined by Will iam H. Franklin, Jr., are: 
1. To develop a long-term view towards business practices. 
2. To promote an increased partnership between management and 
labor to fulfi l l  the needs of the firm and the employee. 
3. To increase openness in organizational structure and interac­
tive communication. 
4. To share organizational authority. 
5. To realize the need for the ongoing search for improved 
producti vi ty.° 
Each point wil l be discussed independently, but f irst i t is necessary 
for the American manager to develop an appreciation for the unique 
environment in which the Japanese managers operate. 
Chapter 1 
JAPANESE CULTURAL FACTORS 
The Japanese word, j_e, is a concept that can be 
interchangeably applied to everything from self to home to 
family. A person is an extension of his immediate family 
members, his company, his community, and his nation as a 
whole. All are bound together in an encompassing purpose.^ 
As stated, the Japanese culture is unique. The American manager 
must realize that the Japanese managerial style has been fostered and 
supported by its cultural environment. Therefore, the exportation of 
certain managerial practices may be impossible because of the cultural 
barriers. Within the Japanese labor force there is a strong sense of 
nationalism which produces a high level of motivation in Japanese 
workers. For over a century, "Japan has invested its best segments of 
capital and labor with special stress to strengthening the competitive 
power of i ts export industries."^0 This national commitment has 
increased the dedication of the Japanese worker. 
Confucian teachings. Buddhism, and Shinto are often cited as the 
foundation of the Japanese ethos which places a high value on dedica­
tion and accomplishment. These accomplishments are realized at the 
work place, not solely for the individual, but for the good of the 
nation.This is evidenced by the Japanese business executive who is 
different from his foreign counterparts, in that the Japanese executive 
is "a latter-day embodiment of the traditional samurai morality."12 i t 
is not the profit incentive which motivates him, but rather his devo­
tion to his firm and the advancement of his nation. 
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Physical l imitations have in some ways forced the development of 
this national motivation. Japan's lack of natural resources has driven 
the people to improve their standard of l iving by their own collective 
will and l i tt le else. It follows that Japan must increase the labor 
productivity in its export-oriented industries in order to support a 
population of more than one hundred ten mill ion people with such 
l imited cultivable l and .13 jhe combination of these historical and 
economical elements has created a highly motivated work force. One 
American manager after touring a Japanese manufacturing plant was to 
comment that 
.  . . these workers here work hard and they were working 
just as hard when we weren't looking! I  have seen an inten­
sity in the work force that I  don't think exists anywhere 
else in the world. 
This national commitment has spawned traditions of duty, obedience 
and discipline which favor the paternalistic clan form of organization 
found within Japanese industries. As long ago as 1898 this paternalism 
was seen in the Japanese way of thinking. It was then that the Tokyo 
Chamber of Commerce wrote that "relations between employees an 
employers are just l ike those within family. The young and the old 
help one another and consult together in both good times and bad ."15 
This philosophy abetted the establishment of mutual aid and retirement 
systems for workers around 1905. Up to this point in time i t was not 
uncommon for apprentices to move from one company to another before 
finishing their training for a higher wage. By providing this added 
security, workers stopped moving from company to company.!^ 
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Familial roots are a basic tenet of Japanese corporate l i fe, 
whereas in American business the principles of contract govern the cor­
porate structure. The pros and cons of each style are numerous, but 
one Japanese executive may have a valid point when he asks, "Which has 
the greater potential for lasting strength in the marketplace: the 
firm held together by contracts, or one which assumes a degree of human­
istic solidarity?"^^ The energy of human bonds would seem to be more 
effective than the imprint of ink on paper. 
The Japanese workers submit themselves to the paternalistic com­
pany for a variety of reasons. The population has long been accustomed 
to a highly disciplined way of l i fe throughout their school years. 
Japanese education emphasizes discipline and c o n f o r m ity,^8 qualit ies 
which seek the security that a Japanese firm can offer. In the crowded 
megalopolises of Japan no strong human t ies exist in the form of neigh­
borhoods, as known in America. Therefore, individuals seek community 
at the workplace.A Japanese company has two facets -- a functional 
body and a community. The employee and his family feel secure 
belonging to a huge company. With this control over the employees, i t  
is asserted that the Japanese firm provides its employees with a sense 
of l i fe worth.20 
Another factor contributing to this worker submission is that 
because of the intense competition for good employment opportunities, 
the Japanese worker is very dil igent and develops a strong sense of 
belonging to his company. Most Japanese expect to remain with the same 
company throughout their career .21 The motives of management are human­
istic as well as practical. I t is usual for the employer "to consider 
the departure of a 'basic worker' as a failure of personnel management. 
The worker was hired under the premise that he would be a l i fetime 
employee in  order to mainta in returns on investment in  t r a i n i n g .  
Also, a family-like relationship helps to minimize the antagonism which 
often results between management and labor and produces strikes. 
The Japanese worker also has a need to belong. To fulfi l l  this 
need he is will ing to subordinate himself to the higher collective 
goals of the firm. "The Japanese equivalent of the Protestant 
work ethic l ies in the concept of sacrificing personal interest for the 
organizational good ."23 Individualism is encouraged in Western society, 
but just the opposite within the Japanese culture. In Japan, "being a 
unique person is often assumed to be bad because being unique implies th 
one is not well balanced . ... The most important aim is not the in­
dividual good; rather i t is trying to keep h a r m o n y . " 2 4  Maintaining har­
mony within a group is of paramount importance in all Japanese relations 
The notion of "saving face" stems from this, as i t is considered highly 
improper to embarrass an individual. This avoidance of conflict is 
necessary according to one Japanese government official who says, 
"Our system is born of the traditions and history of this 
country, a small nation with few resources. Without our way 
of doing things, there would be continued conflict and 
nothing would ever get done."25 
The Japanese language contains no single word that means privacy. 
This is reflected within the work groups in Japanese firms as co-
workers know each other so well that they assume responsibil ity as a 
group for the errors of one individualThe distinction to be made 
is that the individual does not assume responsibil ity for his actions. 
The group does. Therefore the cohesiveness of the group is 
strengthened, and the individuals work for the group, not themselves. 
Within the aforementioned paternalistic clan organization working 
toward a common goal is taken for granted, as noted by Will iam G. 
Ouchi, a student of Japanese organizations. 
. . .  I n  a  c l a n ,  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  t o l d  t o  d o  
just what is needed. However, the socialization of all to 
a common goal is so complete and the capacity of the system 
to measure the subtleties of contribution over the long-run 
is so exact that individuals will naturally seek to do that 
which is in the common g o o d .27 
Initially, this idea may seem incomprehensible to the Westerner 
who places a great deal of emphasis on individuality. The American 
manager may also feel that his subordinates would not fulfi l l  the com­
mitment toward working for a common goal. This very theme is obvious 
in Western philosophy, as pointed out by Ouchi. 
Subordinating individual tastes to the harmony of the group 
and knowing that individual needs can never take prece­
dence over the interests of all is repellent to the Western 
cit izen. But a frequent theme of Western philosophers and 
sociologists is that individual freedom exists only when 
people will ingly subordinate their self-interests to the 
social interest.28 
Quite possibly. Westerners may not be as individualistic as they per­
ceive themselves to be. Contrary to the feelings of American managers 
workers may indeed work in a dedicated manner, toward a common goal, i  
given the appropriate direction. 
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Japanese productivity and quality at the work place are enhanced 
by this group orientation. In addition, the Japanese worker is even 
more conscientious and dil igent because many Japanese believe in their 
work as the highest self-fulfi l l ing goal for them to attain. Japanese 
workers do regard their work as the most important part of their 
overall l ives.They view their company as an extension of their 
family l i fe. Many of them equate the importance of their company with 
that of their own l ife.^® While holding their work in such esteem i t 
is clear as to why the quality of Japanese workmanship is so high. 
Throughout his schooling a Japanese child is being prepared for 
his future career. Competition is acute for entry into certain schools 
at all levels. The drive to fulfi l l  the goal of obtaining a secure 
position begins at a very early age. This attitude of Japanese career 
development is not at all common in the United States. 
In Japan, work is not considered to be an infringement on 
human freedom. The Japanese believe that to work is to l ive 
and that at work one establishes identity. Neither blue- or 
white-collar workers consider their interests to be opposed 
to those of the company; a worker's salary and bonuses 
reflect the company's success. 
This same attitude is reflected in other facets of the Japanese 
work environment. To the Japanese worker delays are something to be 
ashamed of and might cause problems for others. The concern for others 
is also a reason why the Japanese worker wil l not take all his allotted 
vacation time. The workers hate to inconvenience their colleagues in 
the office. The average Japanese employee works 2,114 hours per year, 
while his Western counterpart works 2,000 hours per year .32 ^ot 
10 
surprisingly, the rate of absenteeism is very low, less than one per­
cent in most i n d u s t r i e s .These statistics lend credence to the fact 
that the Japanese view their work as more than "just a job." 
The Japanese government puts forth a great effort to ensure that 
the unemployment rate in Japan is held low. "The close ties between 
Japanese government and industry have generated much crit icism from 
Americans, but these ties are an extension of the same philosophy --
working together for the nation's good ."34 Government regulation is 
often used by American managers as the scapegoat for many of the pro­
blems affl icting American industry. I t generally comes down to a 
matter of attitude when comparing the two vastly different cultures. 
In Japan, unlike in the United States, i t is generally held that a 
strict government that regulates business will bring progress, 
prosper i t y  and  a  be t te r  soc ie ty .35  
Contrary to what many American managers may believe, Japanese 
industry is subject to a fair amount of government regulation in Japan. 
Japanese executives perceive their government differently from how 
their American counterparts view their own government. "Business 
operations are based on human t ies -- priority is placed on good human 
relations rather than on stringent regulations."36 There is more 
cooperation between the government and industrial sectors in Japan than 
in the United States. When a decision is implemented by the Japanese 
government i t is thought to be best for the society at large. This is 
in direct contrast to the American "adversarial culture in which business. 
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labor and government are constantly at one another's throat. An adver­
sarial system is not the correct way to develop a coherent, pragmatic 
economic policy."^^ 
Several examples wil l show how the government in Japan acts for 
the good of society. Between 1965 and 1979 Japanese industry spent 
more than fifteen bil l ion dollars on pollution controls.38 jhe 
Japanese government would not reduce air quality standards as the 
United States government did during the oil crisis of 1973-74. 
Japanese scientists were forced to find new alternatives. The Japanese 
government did allow all of the automakers in Japan to combine 
resources and work together to develop a method to reduce auto 
emissions. This would have been i l legal in the United States because 
of anti-trust laws. Japan's cooperative effort appears to have a more 
coherent and effective strategy in dealing with air pollution as they 
are ahead of the United States by two years in emission-control 
technology.These Japanese regulations are formed only when the par­
ties involved agree, after a long period of discussion. 
Another example is in the area of finances. The Japanese govern­
ment guarantees loans to some Japanese businesses ensuring that these 
companies wil l not go out of business. Interest rates in May, 1982, 
were 6.55 percent in Japan compared to the United States prime rate of 
16.5 percent.The fact that the Japanese savings rate is much higher 
than that of the United States definitely has a bearing on the lower 
interest rates in Japan. In many ways the Japanese government provides 
a healthy climate for the business sector, but the government-
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interference argument in the United States is far too simple for the 
American manager to explain away his woes. Many American industries 
have shown a pathological inability to look toward their welfare in the 
long-run.This is the f irst lesson the American manager may learn 
from his Japanese counterpart: develop a long-term view towards busi­
ness practices. 
Chapter 2 
A LONG-TERM VIEW 
This is where the challenge to American management practice 
l ies. When we can admit to the exorbitant costs of turnover 
-- the cost of replacement, the loss of continuity and sta­
bil ization, and the reluctance to invest heavily in the edu­
cation of people we may lose in a few years -- and when we 
begin to believe that the interests of employees and their 
firms can converge for long periods, perhaps careers, we wil l 
have broken through the principle obstacle blocking develop­
ment of the benefits in long-term perspective to business 
management. 
Japanese managers are amazed that American managers receive bonu­
ses which are related solely to the previous year's results. To the 
Japanese this will lead directly to neglecting important steps having 
to do with the long-term future of any company. Planning for a one or 
two year period does not seem wise to the Japanese because of the dyna­
mic environment in which their companies must function. The keen 
attention to this state of f lux is partly culturally inbred as the 
"Japanese are reluctant to believe any unitary view of the world 
thoroughly. This manifests itself in the idea that the world is 
constantly changing and everything will move on l ike a flowing river, 
which is enhanced by the Buddhist view of the world.Hence, a stra­
tegy that may be beneficial for a f irm in the coming year, may well be 
detrimental in the long-run. 
In comparison to the American firm the Japanese do everything with 
a view toward the long-term results. For example, i f the Japanese had 
a market for one mill ion tons of a product, they would build a plant 
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with a capacity for four mill ion tons. Then they would lose money until 
they hit the breakeven point, but eventually i t pays off.^^ One 
American industry analyst was noted to observe that "our foreign com­
petition in the world of trade is more than ready to make market 
investments that may not pay off for a decade. They are will ing to 
spend years positioning themselves to conquer the global markets. 
The Japanese have shown us through their success that patience pays 
off. 
The long-term view in Japan is also supported by managers who 
expect to spend their entire career with a single firm. Because of 
this, the goal of those at the managerial level is not to dazzle share­
holders with short-term profits, but to ensure the stable long-term 
growth of the company.Upon assessing the situation in Japan, one 
American executive observed, "I have seen the will to spend capital 
without worrying about short-term profits.The opposite is true in 
the United States as executives scramble to pacify stockholders with 
large dividends and to ensure that their individual bonuses are of a 
sizeable amount. 
As the dividends and bonuses are large, so are the problems which 
attend the short-term American view. High turnover rates are an 
appropriate example. In manufacturing and clerical occupations, com­
panies have an annual turnover rate of f ifty percent and as high as 
ninety percent in some years; at the executive levels, turnover rates 
of twenty-five percent are not unknown.Not surprisingly, many 
American employees manifest the same short-term view toward their jobs 
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that their employers hold toward the operation of the firm, as the 
above figures show. A view to the long-run can be cost-effective for 
the American manager, but for this to occur there must be a change in 
corporate philosophy, both on paper and in practice. 
In discussing corporate philosophy, a researcher of Japanese busi­
ness points out that 
.  . . the company consists of a set of managers who see 
clearly that their capacity to achieve close cooperation 
depends in part on their agreeing on a central set of objec­
tives and ways of doing business. These agreements comprise 
their philosophy of the business, a broad statement that 
contemplates the proper relationship of the business to its 
employees, i ts owners, i ts customers, and the 
public-at-large.^^ 
This philosophy should incorporate all relevant business factors, and 
be an aid in guiding the firm in the long-run. "The basic mechanism of 
control in a Japanese company is embodied in a philosophy of management 
which describes the objectives and procedures that guide it."50 The 
development of a philosophy is the necessary initial step in adapting 
the organization towards a long-term outlook because of the element of 
control which can be built into the day-to-day functioning of the 
organization. The philosophy facil itates the everyday operation as i t 
"provides both control over the way people respond to problems and 
coordination between them".51 
The coordination is necessary since the Japanese are culturally 
averse to face-to-face confrontation. It is natural that they rely on 
their corporate philosophies for an element of control. The specific 
philosophy is communicated to both management and labor because 
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. . .  i f  e v e r y o n e  u n d e r s t a n d s  w h a t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  
trying to do and what i ts values are for how to do things, 
then every employee who truly understands the philosophy can 
figure out what his or her course of action should be in an 
ambiguous situation. No directives or explicit control 
system are needed because the controls are internalized.52 
American firms can successfully implement a change in their philo­
sophies, but upper-level management must support the change for success 
to occur. 
By adapting to a long-term view, cooperation is fostered both 
internally and externally for the organization. The corporate organi­
zation realizes that i t must function proactively within its environ­
ment. In order to do this the organization must reconcile itself with 
all operating forces, from labor unions to governmental agencies. The 
necessity for this to occur within American business is supported by an 
analysis of the relations among labor, management and government. The 
present relations are not effective in adapting to the current business 
environment. A great deal of adversarial relations are built into the 
American corporate way of thinking, manifesting itself in both legisla­
tion and grievance procedures. This counter-productive relationship is 
based on a philosophy of contest for splitt ing the pie between workers 
and owners .53 Unfortunately, the philosophy of each sector is based on 
an individualistic short-term view, in other words, "What can I  get for 
myself, now!" 
The arguments against developing a long-term philosophy are weak 
when compared to the long-term success of many Japanese firms. One 
example aptly proves this to be so. The Amdahl Corporation, a United 
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States computer manufacturer, experienced outstanding growth between 
1975 and 1978 as revenues soared from ninety-two mill ion dollars to 
three hundred mill ion dollars.54 As i ts sale of computers soared so 
did its demand for semiconductor chips. In 1976 another United States 
firm. Advanced Memory Systems (AMS) was a supplier for Amdahl. Through 
innovation, Amdahl required a new custom-designed chip and tried to 
convince AMS that they would quickly recoup the cost of retooling for 
production. AMS chose instead to get out of the business. Speaking in 
1978, Gerre White, the chairman of Amdahl, assessed the situation by 
saying, "If they (AMS) had stayed with us, our purchases from them 
would have been equal to their entire sales at the time they left. But 
they couldn't wait."55 The new supplier which enjoyed the surge in 
Amdahl's business was a Japanese firm will ing to make a long-term 
r\mmi 
W i i l l l l  I  U l l l d  I  u  •  
As an American firm commits i tself to a long-term philosophy, 
practical methods must be implemented for managers and workers, alike, 
to change their outlook to the long-term also. The traditional 
American manager is constantly concerned with climbing the corporate 
ladder as quickly as possible, looking for his individual rewards. 
Upper management continues to encourage this self-centered train of 
thought as the novice manager is evaluated and rewarded upon completion 
of an assignment. This process of rapid evaluation and promotion can 
sometimes create a hysterical attitude among managers who feel that 
three years without a promotion means they have failed.56 jhe after­
math of this whole process i f that people learn to operate without 
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depending on or consulting with others, since their career orientation 
is toward the advancement of the self. 
To alter this self-centered outlook toward one's career, American 
managers need to analyze the benefits of job rotation. Since Japanese 
managers have passed through many of the same functions over the years, 
they can refer to a large array of common experiences. This com­
monality provides them with a shorthand form of communication,57 in 
that they fully understand the circumstances and problems facing each 
department they have worked in. Because of this knowledge, a sense of 
comraderie is enhanced as wll work toward the good of the firm. Herein 
l ies the essence of the second lesson for the American manager; i f the 
goals of the firm are to be optimally achieved, then the needs of the 
employee must be met f irst. This can be realized if there is a cor­




The Japanese are concerned with the employee and the pro­
duct- Americans just care about the product. The Japanese 
appear very much to want the employee to be comfortable. I  
never got the impression that the higher-up Japanese mana­
gers don't have time to talk. They usually seem concerned 
whereas the American bosses convey a "you have to work, 
that's all there is to it" attitude. 
American managers need to change their subservient attitudes 
toward their workers and promote an increased partnership between 
management and labor. The personal and job-related needs of all the 
employees must be fulfi l led as much as possible. In this way, the 
goals of the firm may be met in a cost-effective manner. The attri­
butes and behavior of individuals must be properly evaluated to uti l ize 
labor resourcefully. "Concern for the whole employee, not for just his 
performance, is a characteristic of the Japanese company. This concern 
is essential to attaining high productivity and standards."^9 
Japanese managers regard i t as an integral part of their mana­
gerial tasks to invest energy and care into the process of accom­
modating subordinates' feelings. This is not to say that certain 
American managers are any less skil lful in these areas than their 
Japanese counterparts. But in acquiring and applying such communi­
cation skil ls and personal attitudes, American managers seem to have 
to "swim upstream," culturally.^® "If we look at the United States, 
there is a very strong tendency among industrial engineers, economists, 
management and government officials to underestimate the potential of 
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harnessing worker cooperation to raise productivity and to improve 
quali ty. 
It will be no easy task for the American manager to adapt, but the 
Japanese approach is much more realistic and pragmatic. Ironically, 
within American organizations the characteristics of clarity, certainty 
and perfection are highly valued, while the nature of human rela­
tionships involve ambiguity, uncertainty and imperfection. How one 
honors, balances and integrates the needs of both is the real challenge 
of effective management. 
The work group is one technique of Japanese managerial style which 
fulfi l ls specific needs of workers. A sense of belonging and par­
ticipation in the decision-making process results from group effort and 
participation. An indication of the high level of the will to work 
among Japanese factory workers is the small group activities such as 
quality control circles and zero defect movements which have been 
widely introduced, inspired by the series of reforms carried out by 
Sony in  the  ear ly  1960 's  fo r  the  purpose o f  human r e c o v e r y . 6 3  M a n y  
analysts would agree that the American business sector is in a prime 
position for human recovery. 
In Japan no one individual carries responsibil ity for a particular 
turf. Rather, a group or team of employees assumes joint respon-
cibil ity for a set of tasks.In the same l ight, the American manager 
must also attempt to share responsibil ity for the functioning of a 
department with those around him. This is a philosophical change which 
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must come about to achieve the aforementioned goals of partnership. An 
American executive on tour in Japan was to comment, 
"Nearly every time I  heard an employee of Intel or one of 
the other companies refer to the firm, i t was as 'we.'" 
This sense of belonging is indeed real by financial 
standards as Intel employees have invested $60 mill ion 
of their own money into the company through a special stock 
purchase plan.^^ 
Americans strive on individualism whereas working in groups has 
been alleged to come naturally to the Japanese as their culture sup­
ports the group concept. Working in groups may not be any more natural 
for them than i t is for Americans. The Japanese, however, have been 
will ing to give much more effort to developing and maintaining group 
functions.Working in groups is not necessarily in contrast to 
America's love of individualism. Philosophically, "two versions of 
individualism exist—one which focuses on selfishness and takes advan­
tage of the group, and one which focuses on self-actualization in the 
interest of maximizing for both the individual and the group, the 
talents latent in the m e m b e r s . latter style can be implanted in 
American organizations, with the support of management. Herein l ies 
the irony of the group process. In order for a f irm to adapt to a 
"bottom-up" philosophy, i t must be implemented "top-down." 
One of the greatest fears that U.S. managers have of groups is 
that responsibil ity and accountability wil l become diffused. These 
managers feel the need to be able to identify individually who is 
accountable for what, even when the realit ies of a task may make shared 
responsibil ity more appropriate.68 The group needs to be held equally 
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accountable for the actions of each member. Thereby, the members 
become more dependent on one another. The American manager must 
realize that this dependency does not weaken the group's drive to excel 
and to achieve. On the contrary, i t seems to feed the group's ambi­
t ion, as proven in many Japanese work groups .^9 
When implementing work groups, the American executive is certain 
to appoint a leaderj, which is seen as a prestigious position, but this 
perception can be detrimental to the functioning of the group process; 
members strive for leadership, foregoing their common goal of cohesion. 
"The Japanese are indifferent to who wil l be the leader in the group. 
A leader is not a dictator; he is a member of the group and is only 
temporarily responsible for the actions of the group—maintaining har­
mony is the most important task of the leader."^0 He does not 
selfishly strive to advance his own career, but functions in a self-
actualizing manner to help bring the group as a whole to fruition. 
Again, attitudes nurtured by the underlying fundamental philosophy play 
a crucial role in improving the quality of work l i fe. 
Japan places people f irst in its priority system,a philosophy 
which is highly contrasted in American management as the traditional 
"bottom-line" dictates the outcome of the decision-making process. 
This people-first attitude has proven beneficial in developing a cohe­
sive work force. While Western laborers are said to be attached to 
their profession, to an individual job, their Japanese counterparts are 
said to be attached to their companies. The Japanese work ethic, which 
is defined as maintenance of a sense of purpose, derives form company 
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loyalty. Such allegiance is not ethnically Japanese corporate 
management.72 
The overriding principle that comes through to us from the 
Japanese principles of management is: they treat employees 
as human beings. Each employee is part of the "family." 
Each employee gets a chance to participate in company decision­
making, through quality circles, i f not otherwise. This 
apparently has built a great sense of company loyalty in 
the employees. 
The simplicity of these facts is supportive evidence that much the same 
can be achieved within American firms. 
There are several other factors which also foster company loyalty 
among Japanese workers. The Japanese managers in the past felt that i f 
workers were dismissed during slow periods, i t might not be possible to 
recruit enough people when the next upturn began. Training costs were 
thus saved and the system of l ifetime employment became entrenched 
within the Japanese corporate structure.^4 in present-day form this 
system is widely misconstrued as only thirty percent 75 of the Japanese 
labor force is working under this system. Stil l these workers are more 
loyal to their companies because of l i fe-time employment and the 
seniority-based wage system.76 
Japanese labor unions are also a key factor as to why the Japanese 
workers develop such fierce company loyalty. The system is in direct 
contrast to the American labor union system. "Japanese labor unions 
are organized on a company-by-company basis encouraging a strong sense 
of sharing the fate of their company. This sense is reinforced by the 
fierce competition among industries for a bigger market s h a r e ."77 
American union system is so entrenched that i t is highly unlikely that 
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i t will change, but this should not be used as an obstacle to 
increasing worker loyalty to the firm. 
American managers need to revamp their reward system for workers. 
Instead of rewarding individual performance in production a worker 
should be rewarded for his abil ity to develop the people with whom he 
works, to quietly foster results that benefit the company as a whole. 
This revamped reward system will provide the necessary cohesion among 
workers instead of reinforcing the Americanized competition. 
If a partnership is to be formed within the American firm the next 
lesson for the American manager is self-evident; an increased openness 
in organizational structure and interactive communication must take 
place. As one can see, this and the preceding lessons are all f inely 
interwoven, supportive of one another, forming a complete perspective. 
The same should be true of the components of the American workplace. 
Chapter 4 
INCREASED OPENNESS 
Private offices are a status symbol in the United States. 
I  worry about those walls. Americans spend a lot of time 
in their offices and call people in. But there is a 
possible problem—it creates distance between managers 
and their subordinates and col leagues. 
In order to eliminate communication barriers, and to nurture the 
sense of partnership, both the physical and attitudinal structure of 
the traditional American firm must be altered. The American manager 
must facil itate communication at all levels and involve necessary indi­
viduals in the decision-making process. The Japanese appear to have 
employed techniques which have proven very succesful in fostering and 
enhancing communication. 
As a rule, the physical structure of major Japanese offices is a 
large open space. An entire group of white collar workers, belonging 
to one business division, work at desks with no partit ions. This 
environment encourages constant human contact and intimacy between 
superiors and subordinates, and among subordinates themselves.^0 
Interpersonal skil ls are nurtured by the physical setting. The same is 
not true for the traditional American offices which neatly partit ion 
individuals behind four walls. Implicit communication is a feature of 
Japanese human relations cultivated within an intimate group environment. 
This arrangement offers several benefits other than strictly moti­
vation and communication. 
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1. It fosters a consistency in behavior. 
The middle manager would f ind i t 
difficult to treat subordinates 
differently from superiors. 
2. It puts a premium on performance, since 
everyone is witness to everyone else. 
3. It greatly assists evaluation of 
performance at all levels. 
This physical office design is also supported by constructive 
channels of communication. Many of the Japanese companies have an open 
door policy. Each employee has access to each manager regardless of 
the chain of command. Higher managers are rarely in their offices, as 
they spend much of their time in the large open work areas, which 
facil itates direct c o n t a c t . jhe opposite is true in America where 
many managers appear to be closeted away in their prized cells. 
Because of the large amount of exposure to managers by the 
Japanese workers, the Japanese boss is more of a mentor. He teaches 
through subtle cues rather than blunt feedback, exercising great 
patience while the subordinate learns how to interpret cues and to 
develop his or her own skil ls. At the same time, this manager is rein­
forcing the basic company philosophy as a conceptual source that helps 
subordinates to decide what to do in a given situation.This inbred 
implicit communication aids in the smooth functioning of day-to-day 
operations. 
American managers fail to realize the importance of facil itating 
communication. In the Japanese firm, interdepartmental consultation 
and negotiation is understood to be everyone's concern, whereas 
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American managers rarely coordinate communication well. "They lack 
human skil ls and seem much less familiar with other parts of the organ­
ization. A good Japanese-style middle manager knows everybody so he 
can get good information."84 American executives are quoted by 
Japanese managers as saying, "I 've spent the whole damn day on the 
telephone and I  didn't get anything done because people kept 
interrupting me."^^ What Americans view as petty distraction from 
their jobs, the Japanese view as central to theirs. 
Once the American manager realizes the importance of establishing 
an open communicative rapport with his firm, the garnered information 
must be properly uti l ized, especially within the decision-making pro­
cess. Japanese managers demand far more responsible participation of 
all workers than American managers do. The Japanese believe that all 
e m p l o y e e s  a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  t h i n k i n g  a  p r o b l e m  t h r o u g h . j h i s  i s  
surprising to American businessmen as they see the Japanese l istening 
to and adopting the suggestions made by their employees. When an 
important decision needs to be made in a Japanese organization, 
" .  .  .  e v e r y o n e  w h o  w i l l  f e e l  i t s  i m p a c t  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m a k i n g  i t .  
What is important is not the decision itself, but rather how committed 
and informed people are. The 'best' decision can be bungled, just as 
the 'worst' decision can work just fine."^^ 
The Japanese process is focused on understanding the problem. In 
gathering pertinent information, the process is geared to discovering 
what the decision should be. Its result is a meeting of the minds that 
there is, or is not, a need for a change in behavior.^^ By 
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understanding an issue, the participants are better able to commit them­
selves to the formation of a decision. "The findings of behavioral 
science suggest that often the quality of commitment to a decision 
rather than the quality of some dimension of the decision itself is 
the most crit ical factor in the fate of a project."89 
In brief, the purpose of participatory management is to reach a 
consensus based on close coordination of the activities of each func­
tional area affected by the issue. For the Westerner, 
...a decision process based on consensus conveys a host 
of horrors—interminable meetings, endless squabbling 
and ultimate indecision. The Japanese system does not 
demand that all participants "sign off." Those that 
affix their seals are giving their consent, not necessarily 
their approval. He has been heard, wil l go along with i t 
and support i t, though he may sti l l  disagree. 
This seemingly cumbersome decision process takes place within the 
framework of an underlying agreement on philosophy, values and beliefs. 
Again, this is pointing to the importance of f irst developing an actual 
working philosophy under which the firm may function. 
American managers have been bred to be dependent on their leader. 
Many Japanese chief executives of American subsidiaries equate consen­
sus with abrogation of their personal responsibi1ty for the firm's per­
formance, and thus both parties are bewildered. The leadership 
practice is expected and supported by American subordinates, and this is 
particularly strong in small to medium-sized firms. Japanese managers 
merely l isten to both sides of an argument and typically conclude in 
silence. The Japanese do not understand why the Americans do not just 
go ahead and resolve the known problems themselves.The Japanese 
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are will ing to share organizational authority, and often times the 
American manager is not prepared to grasp i t. The next lesson for the 
American manager now appears apropos: The sharing of organizational 
authori ty. 
Chapter 5 
SHARING ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY 
All the Japanese here (U.S.A.) have had problems managing 
the Americans. The Japanese expect the subordinates to 
think, but the American attitude is, "You tell me what to do 
and I ' l l  do i t -- but i t 's your respons ibi1 i t y ."92 
The problems with this "American" attitude is that American 
workers do not wish to assume authority with its contingent respon­
sibil it ies. Herein l ies a challenge for American management. In 
meeting this challenge people must be considered an energy source, and 
the goal of management is not to control but to release the energy in 
people. This is done by the Japanese manager's insistence that his 
people think and participate responsibly in business affairs. The pri­
mary role of management is not in giving orders, but in facil itating 
action, bringing about the cooperation and consensus among dissident 
viewpoints. There is no l imit to what American industry could 
accomplish i f the creative thinking people demonstrate in every other 
area of their l ives could be given full expression in their jobs.^^ 
Possibly indicating a trend, American chief executive officers 
show that the keynote of management style today is shared authority at 
the top. This is in contrast to the highly autocratic, one-man rule of 
the past. Most chief executives are progressively distributing much of 
t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  c o m p a n y . T h o u g h  i t  i s  
encouraging to see this sharing of authority at managerial levels, i t 
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must trickle down to labor as well, in order for an organization to 
truly reap the benefits of this type of decentralized management. 
In Japan a group of touring American businesmen found the workers 
"incredibly well-educated, using analytical tools used only by pro­
fessionals in the United States. American top management tends to rely 
on high-level engineers to design parts and machinery that defy human 
error because the workers are viewed as i d i o t s ."95 j\ resource within 
American firms is being left untapped. To counter this in their firms, 
Japanese managers are encouraging workers to approach their jobs with 
ingenuity and commitment, and are getting excellent results. The 
employees of Toyota Motors in Japan are a good example. 
Every year Toyota Motors is getting about nine suggestions 
for improvements per employee and is adopting more than 
eighty percent of them. By contrast. General Motors gets 
less than one suggestion per employee per year and adopts 
less than a fourth of those received. Not only are Japanese 
companies getting more suggestions, but they are getting 
better ones.^^ 
The Japanese managers consider workers to be not tools, but individuals 
with great potential for creative input. 
In order for American managers to facil itate action in l ieu of 
giving orders, barriers which exist between management and labor must 
be eliminated. "The most productive American auto plants are those 
that have paid the most attention to fuzzing the class l ines between 
management and labor.The YKK (USA) plant, a Japanese subsidiary, 
in Macon, Georgia has done just that. This zipper manufacturer, with 
thirty percent of the world market, motivates its employees in conven­
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t ional ways, but the key to success in terms of quality and produc­
t ivity is management and labor working together as peers. One YKK 
manager states, "First, you as a manager clean the floor yourself, then 
the employees wil l do i t. In order for management to teach employees 
they must have done the jobs first."98 Unless both management and 
labor change their old ways, the United States will continue to trail 
Japan. 
American workers need to have their energies channeled toward the 
delineated corporate goals. American executives, trained to prepare 
detailed operational procedures for the rank and f i le employees to per­
form their outlined tasks, stif le creativity and individual motivation 
with this procedure. Worker frustration results in actions to decrease 
quality and productivity. One perplexed worker remarks, "We know this 
work better than any other person. We in the l ine consult with each 
other on how to improve our own work, and are happy to see our own work 
improved. What is wrong with that?"99 In the above situation, manage­
ment did not want the workers making mechanical adjustments for they 
were infringing on the technician's territory; low quality products 
were to be overlooked! 
The practical implementation of the sharing of authority can be 
manifested in a variety of ways. Formally, a system of "presentation 
meetings" can help to stimulate workers. 
A l ine worker, for instance, wil l present the results of a 
study made by his team and propose concrete suggestions for 
improvement before an audience which includes his supervisors 
and management personnel. This helps heighten the sense of 
participation, instead of alienation in the workplace. 
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Informally, the Japanese have been able to mesh their employees by 
requiring all workers, at all levels, to wear the same work clothes, 
eat in the same cafeteria, and use the same restrooms. This has been 
done in some Japanese subsidiaries in the United States. Some of the 
American workers feel uncomfortable with the conformity, but Japanese 
e x e c u t i v e s  a r e  r e s p e c t e d  f o r  s h a r i n g  t h e  s a m e  w o r k  c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s  
earned respect has fostered a more dedicated work force, thereby 
increasing productivity. Improved productivity is in fact at the heart 
of the following lesson: American managers must acknowledge the need 
for ongoing research for improved productivity i f they are to compete in 
the global marketplace. 
Chapter 6 
IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY 
After a Japanese firm took over an American Motorola color 
TV plant the rate of defects dropped from 150-180 errors 
per 100 sets to 3-4 errors per 100 sets.^^2 
The guiding ethos of Japanese industry is the ongoing search for 
quality and productivity improvements. When an idea is implemented 
that results in better productivity or product quality, the search 
begins anew for a successor idea. This process never ends.^®^ The 
shared responsibil ity between managers and workers, along with con­
sultative decision-making, help to support this constant re-examination 
of the production process. Various examples of the Japanese revital­
izing a faltering American plant are concrete testimony that the Japan­
ese management practices can be successful when transplanted to a 
United States manufacturing environment. 
The real success of the Japanese is not founded on some magical 
formula, but rather on a methodical pursuit of improving productivity 
in manufacturing practices. Says Masao Kanamori, president of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, "The existence of our company would be 
impossible i f we failed to reassess our performance in quality, produc­
tion and cost."^0^ Japanese realize that they must constantly re­
assess their goals i f they are to compete in the long-run. 
This same long-term commitment is absent in American business. 
Even American executives are cognizant of this fact. David Entreken, 
president of Desco, Inc., in California, is quoted as saying, 
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"No significant sector of U.S. industry has a f ive-year plan 
for automating factories, or even a ten-year plan. In 
Japan, one company had a plan for a plant in 1966 that was 
to be remodernized five years later. It was remodernized in 
1971 and again in 1976. In 1981, the plant was scheduled to 
be remodernized again, and in future years. 
The Japanese are more practical than the Americans in realizing that 
technology is in a constant state of upheaval, and to compete effi­
ciently one must constantly be operating in a state-of-the-art environ­
m e n t .  F o r  i f  h e  d o e s  n o t ,  h i s  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i l l .  
Several examples of the lack of re-investing capital to improve 
productivity can be found in American industries. The United States 
auto industry emphasized marketing in its strategy much more than they 
emphasized technology. The steel industry also lost its technological 
leadership to Japan over thirty years ago.^®^ A commitment to tech­
nology should supersede, in some ways, a commitment to improving rela­
tions with employees. "When i t comes to making steel, a good attitude 
is not as important as a basic-oxygen furnace. On the auto-assembly 
l ine, no amount of team spirit wil l make a door f i t more closely than 
its designed tolerance.The combination of state-of-the-art tech­
nology and a dynamic work force within a manufacturing environment 
deliver dramatic results in both quality and production, as shown in Japan. 
The participation of employees in uti l izing current technology is 
just as important as in the decision-making process, thus the input of 
quality control circles must be considered. Up-to-date technology aids 
in improving quality and productivity. In repetitive manufacturing 
quality improvements reduce waste and rework, and smooth the output 
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rate, thereby improving productivity. The distinction between quality 
and productivity blurs. Japanese quality circles are oriented toward 
both quality and productivity improvements, whereas in the United 
States quality circles are usually concerned exclusively with quality 
matters.The connection to productivity is overlooked. The 
Japanese manager perceives increased productivity to be a by-product of 
management policies; i t is not a main goal of the companies. Quality 
is a main goal; learning curve improvements are a main goal. Out of 
these come productivity increases. The Japanese view the problem on a 
conceptual basis, while the Americans uti l ize an analytical 
approach. 
Having given ample attention to quality control, Japanese managers 
are now confronted with the new task of encouraging individual workers 
to be creative and original. These qualit ies go much better with 
American individualism and personal freedom than with the groupism 
built on the principles of self-denial and hierarchical loyalty. 
The answer may be continuous training, whereby every employee par­
ticipates in formal training as a regular part of his job until he 
retires. In the United States training is promotion-focused, while the 
Japanese training is performance-focused.m The Japanese feel that 
the continual training will foster creativity within the highly tech­
nological industries. American managers have the same problem, only in 
reverse — American workers are independently creative, but need to 
improve their collective work quality. 
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When speaking of quality and production the most powerful example 
for American management is Japan's reliance on "do i t yourself." 
Japanese firms train their own workers, build their own production 
equipment, and then make their own improvements. Engineers are closely 
involved with ongoing problems; their offices are usually adjacent to 
the factory floor. Workers even help design machines and describe pro­
ducts during sales calls. In contrast, American industry has isolated 
engineers in separate buildings. U.S. firms are almost wholly depen­
dent on equipment suppliers because they cannot build or even modify 
their e q u i p m e n t .gy bringing together the engineer's expertise and 
the worker's experience, a more dynamic resource is created to improve 
quality and productivity. 
Concerning technological innovations, the Japanese pattern has 
been to import technology, improve upon i t, then replace i t with native 
machinery and product design. The Japanese are obtaining productive 
results, as the following examples show. Between 1964 and 1975 the 
Japanese dramatically increased the productivity of their steel 
industry, reducing the man hours required to produce a ton of steel 
from 25.2 to 9.2.1^3 During the same years American productivity 
improved only slightly, from 13.1 to 10.9.^1'^ In the auto industry, 
thirty-five workers aided by industrial robots produce three hundred 
f ifty Datsun car bodies every eight hours, seven times the productivity 
rate of competing American au tomakers .US 
The failure to develop long-term strategies has led many other 
United States industries to lose the technological leadership they 
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maintained fifteen to twenty years ago. Michelin of France provides a 
concise example of the American manager's reluctance to adapt to tech­
nological advancements. 
Michelin of France led the way in radial t ires even 
though i t was obvious to most American tire-industry execu­
tives that the radial t ire was a superior product. But i f 
they went into i t, they would make all the existing invest­
ment in the standard bias-belted tires obsolete. So they 
delayed and delayed. 
In the short-run they increased their profits, but in 
the long-run they induced Michelin to enter the U.S. and 
build plants here. The Japanese are here, too. So American 
t ire companies are frantically trying to do under duress 
what they should have been doing more leisurely and care­
fully ten to fifteen years ago.^^® 
The computer, semiconductor and aircraft industries have main­
tained technological leadership in the United States, but even they are 
under pressure. The Japanese are making a determined attack on the 
computer industry and the success of the European-made Airbus is stimu­
lating American aircraft firms to increase technological 
development.American managers need the competition to force them, 
in many cases, to keep an eye to the future. 
The Japanese prove that to be adaptable to innovative technology 
there must be a capital commitment on the part of management. 
"Japanese business leaders believe in making investments that may seem 
risky in the short-run, as long as they look profitable in the 
long-run.In terms of research and development, the Japanese are 
spending much more than their United States counterparts. American 
corporations spend "an average of about one percent of total sales 
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on research and development. In Japan the figure is closer to six 
percent.The Japanese are investing as much money, in absolute 
terms, as the United States businessmen are -- or about twice the rate 
p e r  c a p i t a . 1 2 0  
The facts and figures may seem dismal to the American manager but 
there are definite signs of hope. The deep-rooted problems affl icting 
American business are not insurmountable, and there are varied examples 
of recovery within firms and industries which support that fact. After 
World War I I Japan was an eager student of the United States, as the 
island nation reconstructed its society amidst devastation. The time 
has now come for American businessmen to let Japan fulfi l l  the role of 
the teacher, and let themselves be the student. Actually, this is 
already occurring to some degree, as the following chapter shows that 
Japanese managerial principles and techniques are alive and well in the 
United States. 
Chapter 7 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Japanese raise quizzical eyebrows at U.S. management 
experts who have been descending on Japan in droves to learn 
of the secrets of their amicable employee relations, high 
productivity and company loyalty. The Japanese freely admit 
they learned about quality circles, operations management, 
and other techniques from the United Sta tes .^21 
Examples of the successful implementation of Japanese managerial 
style within the United States are numerous. They speak for them­
selves, and are testament to the fact that the i l ls that plague 
American business are curable. Japanese subsidiaries in the United 
States and American firms adapting the Japanese style have shown that 
the American workers are highly productive under the correct supportive 
circumstances. A long-term view, partnership, communication, shared 
power, and research and development commitments are all evidenced in 
the following examples. First, a look at Japanese subsidiaries in the 
United States. 
Sanyo Electric, Inc., of Los Angeles insti l ls company loyalty in 
American workers with extensive benefits. Yoshimi Takemoto, president 
of the electronics firm, said, "We try to get inside the heart and make 
them realize they are not just part of a machine. We try to treat them 
all e q u a l l y .By instil l ing pride in the workers, productivity and 
quality have risen. In Forest City, Arkansas, the Warwick Electronics 
plant, a subsidiary of the Whirlpool Corporation, was taken over by 
Sanyo Electric. Mr. Takemoto initiated a clean-up program shortly 
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thereafter. The plant had been operating with a deficit. The improved 
housekeeping gave the workers a sense of pride, resulting in a better 
product. An employee confidence program was also instituted. 
Production rose "from four hundred twenty-five TV sets per day to two 
thousand eight hundred sets per day, and roughly one thousand laid-off 
employees have returned to work ."123 
American workers have indeed responded to the Japanese managerial 
philosophy. In the farm belt of Wisconsin, where a Japanese food com­
pany established a plant, a technician said: 
"I l ike my job. It is interesting and gives me a chance to 
advance. I  take satisfaction in contributing to a good prod­
uct. The Japanese are patient decision makers. They 
l isten to many opinions before making up their minds. When 
a decision is made, you know that i t has been well thought 
out."124 
Testimonials such as this are heard in various locations in the United 
States. Problems with communication and cultural misunderstanding do 
occur, but when the Japanese managers resolve the issues the firm 
actively prospers. 
Perhaps the following passage best describes the atmosphere and 
success of a U.S. Japanese subsidiary. 
Time clocks are banned from the premises. Managers and 
workers converse on a first-name basis and eat lunch 
together in the company cafeteria. Employees are briefed 
once a month by a top executive on sales and production 
goals and are encouraged to air their complaints. Four 
times a year, workers attend company-paid parties. Says 
Betty Price, an assembly l ine person, "Working for Sony is 
l ike working for your family." This year the San Diego 
plant will turn out 700,000 color television sets, one third 
of Sony's total world production. More significantly, com­
pany officials now proudly say that the plant's produc­
t ivity approaches that of i ts Japanese facil it ies. Plant 
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manager Shiro Yamada insists that there are a few differ­
ences between workers in the U.S. and Japan. Says he: 
"Americans are as quality conscious as the Japanese. But 
the question has been how to motivate them.''^^^ 
From that last statement by Mr. Yamada there is evidence that many 
problems in United States industry do stem from management, not from 
the workers. This is supported by the experience of the Volkswagens 
of America plant in Pennsylvania. Executives at Volkswagens found 
"that Rabbits made in America were just as good as the German ones. 
Was this work force different from those who turn out low quality 
Pintos and Aspens? No — the workers are all U.A.W. members. The dif­
ference is design, management and newer e q u i p m e n t ."^^6 
Ironically, there are many firms in the United States that have 
been using the techniques found in Japanese management, long before the 
Japanese came upon these techniques. In research performed with 
American managers from several industries, each manager was asked to 
name any American companies that had characteristies thought to be 
peculiar to Japanese firms. Managers named the same organizations 
repeatedly; I.B.M., Proctor and Gamble, Hewlett-Packard and Eastman 
K o d a k .^27 /\n I.B.M. vice president was quoted as saying, "Do you 
realize that this form that you have been describing as Japanese is 
exactly what I.B.M. is? Let me point out that I.B.M. has developed to 
this form in its own way -- we have not copied the J a p a n e s e ."^28 jhe 
main reason for pointing out the success of these techniques in 
American firms is to dispel arguments of the American cultural barriers 
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thought to prohibit implementation of these techniques considered by 
many to be uniquely Japanese. 
University professors of business administration cite American 
firms, such as Delta Air Lines, which also have some of the Japanese 
characteristics. Delta, an airl ine industry leader, is admired for its 
management style. Employees at Delta do not just join a company, they 
join an objective in partnership with management and labor. 
The Delta family feeling has made i t hard for unions to gain 
a foothold. When the airl ines suffered from the 1973 oil 
price hikes. Delta did not lay off some employees as did 
other airl ines. "Now the time has come for the stockholders 
to pay a l i tt le penalty for keeping the team together," said 
the company chiarman.^^^ 
Delta's "family feeling" was present in December of 1982 when grate­
ful employees purchased, through payroll deductions, a thirty mill ion 
dollar Boeing jetl iner in appreciation to the company. Says Will iam 
Batten, chairman and chief executive officer for the New York Stock 
Exchange: "The gift is a dramatic, visible expression of an invisible 
spirit. It shows that "Delta's employees identify their personal well-
being with the company well-being. It is not a we-they attitude, but 
us together. What a symbol this is to American business. 
A classic case of improved productivity within an American firm is 
the General Motors plant in Tarrytown, New York. The company began a 
quality of work l i fe program amidst major labor conflicts and quality 
deficiencies. As union members were invited to provide more than brute 
labor, their innovations improved the quality of the product and their 
commitment transformed the atmosphere of the plant. Grievances against 
44 
management fell from two thousand to thirty, and absenteeism decreased 
from seven percent to two and one-half percent.131 jhis plant is now 
one of General Motors success stories. 
The high tech industry is often cited as one that is well managed. 
A brief history of one firm does explain why. The success of the mana­
gerial style described throughout this paper is apparent. 
Intel, an American firm, was founded in 1968. Since that 
time, its sales have increased by an average of thirty per­
cent each year. It puts more than ten percent of its income 
into research and development, a higher rate than any of its 
competitors. It also brings in more than twice as much 
revenue per employee as the industry norm. Intel's story is 
an advertisement for the classic ingredients in American 
business success: venture capital, initial risks, technical 
pioneering, and plowing the profits back into the firm. 
There is no suite of offices at Intel, managers share a com­
mon s p a c e .132 
A long-term view, partnership, communication, shared authority and a 
research and development commitment are all Intel, 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the lessons from the East help us to return to some 
old American values. Teamwork has been a part of the American ideal 
for a long time, but at least in our business affairs, we have placed 
it second to self and individualism. . . .The Japanese experience 
gives us firm evidence that teamwork and group effectiveness have pro­
ductive v a l u e s .133 
American researchers have delineated the characteristics and tech­
niques of Japanese management in several ways. Ouchi cites seven 
characteristics which describe the Japanese style: 
1. Lifetime Employment 
2. Slow Evaluation and Promotion 
3. Nonspecialized Career Paths 
4. Implicit Control Mechanisms 
5. Collective Decision Making 
6. Collective Responsibility 
7. Wholistic Concernl34 
Pucik and Hatvany have developed a three-tier model of Japanese manage­
ment concentrating on human resource management, rearranging several of 
Ouchi's characteristies. 
1. Focus: Emphasize human resource management. 
2. General Strategies: Develop an internal labor market, articu­




3. Specific Techniques: Job rotation and slow promotion, evalu­
ation of employee attributes and behavior, emphasis on work 
groups, open communication, consultative decision making, and 
concern for the employee. 
The five principles cited in this paper as "lessons" for the 
American manager incorporate the spirit of the techniques of both of 
the aforementioned models. 
1. Developing a long-term view towards business practices stems 
from the spirit of re-investing for the future, life-time 
employment, slow evaluation and promotion, and is stated in a 
unique company philosophy as all five points may be. 
2. Promoting increased partnership to fulfi l l the needs of the 
firm and employee highlights implicit control 
mechanisms, wholistic concern for the employee, and an empha­
sis on work groups. 
3. Increasing openness in organizational structure and com­
munication stresses collective or consultative decision making 
and open communication. 
4. Sharing organizational authority is synonymous with collective 
responsibility while evaluating employee attributes and beha­
vior, to util ize employee talents. 
5. Realizing the need for ongoing research for improved produc­
tivity is a crucial aspect of a long-term company philosophy 
found in many Japanese firms. 
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These five principles, compared above, need to be the cornerstone of 
American managerial techniques for American industry to remain vital. 
Many aspects of traditional American management are simply no 
longer accepted in other societies. Theories and techniques which were 
successful during the expanding 1950's and 1960's are no longer appli­
cable. This is proven by Japanese productivity growth which is not 
languishing to the extent of American p r o d u c t i v i t y ,^36 even though the 
Japanese economy is subject to dependence on expensive oil imports, 
strict government regulations, and demanding labor unions. 
In revamping their style, American managers must be selective. 
Some Japanese techniques are likely to fail in the United States. 
American businessmen are certain to be repelled by the notion of l ife­
time employment. This specific technique is not necessarily desired, 
either. What is important is that the American managers develop a 
long-term view towards business practices, as has been put forth in 
this paper. By increasing the bonds between the employer and employee, 
the employee will remain with a firm longer, if his needs are met. 
In contrast to Japanese executives, American managers have a 
short-term view. American performance evaluations are based on short-
range financial measures. This pressure on short-term results is a 
major factor in thwarting the impetus of industrial technological 
leadership which the United States enjoyed in the past.^37 with 
foreign competition advancing, American managers have been thrust 
towards introspection to ameliorate the problems affecting their 
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industries. Developing a long-term view toward business practices is a 
definite beginning. 
Slow evaluation and promotion also have their shortcomings. An 
employee needs the feedback of evaluation to re-assess his skills, and 
he should be rewarded for his accomplishments, both as an individual 
and as a member of his department. There is a balance which must be 
maintained between the group-oriented philosophy and individualism. 
Both can co-exist within the same organization and should be 
recogni zed. 
Non-specialized career paths are not generally found in American 
management, and again may not be desirable, though the advantages of 
job rotation must not be overlooked. Within many Japanese companies it 
is customary to move employees from one department to another every two 
or three years. In the process the employee acquires varied 
training.The American employee would be able to satisfy his need 
for a new challenge while util izing his expertise from previous posi­
tions. Japanese managers feel "that this policy gives the employees a 
broader view of what the company is trying to do, and helps to build an 
emotional attachment to the company.Turnover rates remain lower 
and the employee realizes he will benefit in the long-run from being 
exposed to various business functions. 
Within highly skilled occupations, specialization is necessary, 
but once a manager has this technical foundation he should be given the 
opportunity to expose himself to the other functional areas of the 
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firm. This will enhance not only his understanding of the organiza­
tion's operational procedures, but also his effectiveness as a 
decision-making manager. 
Because of the ambiguous environment in which the business sector 
operates in the long-run, there is a need to foster more of a sense of 
partnership among employees. "Certainly a system that makes people 
feel a part of the firm by being partners in the peril and progress of 
their company makes more sense than one in which employees receive 
salary increases even when their company suffers an earnings 
decline,which indeed does occur in many American firms. 
Management and labor must share in the fate of the firm; a fate which 
is partially determined by the actions of the individuals involved. As 
Mike Markkula, an executive of Apple Computer, states, "If you took all 
the people out of the buildings, what you'd have is a bunch of 
b u i l d i n g s .  T h e  c o m p a n y  i s  w o r t h  n o t h i n g  w i t h o u t  i t s  p e o p l e . H u m a n  
beings are a firm's greatest asset, and must be developed accordingly. 
Some American managers allege that participatory management will 
lead to chaos and confusion within a firm. This does not have to be 
true. Participatory methods of management can work in the United 
States, but they must be based on the premise that teamwork and par­
ticipation are better ways to solve problems because knowledge, infor­
mation and skills are distributed among a number of p e o p l e .Though 
this cooperative attitude is a drastic change from the individualistic 
attitude prevalent in American business, the consensus decision-making 
process can be successful i f properly understood. 
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Richard A. Kraft, Quasar's vice president of engineering, admits 
"that the committee approach is bothersome at first because it takes 
time and appears to delay decisions needlessly. I  have learned, 
though, to appreciate the approach because it results in solutions that 
work from the outset rather than ones arrived at through trial and 
error.Also, American managers are trying to "sell" their deci­
sions. The Japanese need to spend absolutely no time on "selling" a 
decision; everybody has been presold. 
By forming an alliance with labor, through partnership and collec­
tive decision-making, traditional American managers may feel intimi­
dated. There is no need for American management to feel threatened by 
workers in thinking that they will usurp managerial authority. Line 
workers, as previously stated, want to perform their job as efficiently 
as possible. Management must facilitate this to happen by giving 
employees the authority to influence the firm in matters which they are 
knowledgeable. Productivity is certain to improve with a conscientious 
and responsible work force. 
With a commitment to improving quality and productivity, and to 
developing a dedicated work force, American firms must operate in a 
flexible manner to be able to adapt to necessary new technology. These 
same firms must not only react to new technology, but must also operate 
in a proactive manner. Since World War II, technological progress in 
Japan has depended on the efforts of the private sector. In the United 
States, technological development has been the government's task and 
has been concentrated on military and space technology.The United 
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States private sector needs to commit more capital to research and 
development if it is to remain competitive amidst such technological 
flux. 
Criticism of several of the recommended principles is present and 
is recognized. Recently, an issue of the Niehouse Report criticized 
the use of quality circles and other so-called imported management 
techniques in the United States.report stated that cooperative 
and participatory management and high productivity are successful in 
Japan because of the Japanese culture's group philosophy. The report 
cites that cultural conflicts exist in the United States which may 
hinder the use of these techniques in American organizations. 
Admittedly, conflicts do exist, but they can be overcome, especially if 
constructive communication channels are correctly implemented within an 
organi zati on. 
It is essential to remember that the quality circle philosophy and 
techniques are of American origin, fully exploited by the Japanese. 
Therefore, the U.S. firms are importing nothing from abroad, but are 
being forced to re-examine traditional labor and management philo­
sophies in the United States. The success of the Japanese importation 
i 
I of American techniques is now the catalyst for this re-examination. 
\ Unfortunately, a crisis situation was needed to force American managers 
toward introspection. 
The report also goes on to say that "group philosophy is stifl ing; 
not strong enough to contain individualities."1^7 jhig criticism is a 
valid one as many Japanese workers do feel frustrated and coerced 
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because of the rigid group structure of their organizations. A 
stifl ing group atmosphere is the fault of management, just as a 
creative group atmosphere is to management's credit. No system is per­
fect, and the Japanese do not pretend to be so. An amount of flexibil­
ity must be interwoven in responsible leadership. American managers 
...should exercise leadership that is flexible 
enough to effectively reach organizational goals and 
respect the individuals who will achieve those 
goals. To be effective such leadership must be 
flexible enough to support team work, without 
getting trapped by the group philosophy approach, 
and stil l encourage individuality and c r e a t i v i t y .  
The firm that develops a credible sense of stability and security 
enhances its flexibility. Security and stability will be nurtured by 
the firm that: 
1. Develops a long-term view towards business practices. 
2. Promotes increased partnership to fulfi l l the needs of the firm 
and employee. 
3. Increases openness in organizational structure and com­
munication, 
4. Shares organizational authority, 
5. Realizes the need for ongoing research for improved 
producti vi ty, 
Such are the lessons American managers are now being taught by their 
Japanese counterparts. 
With the onslaught of advanced technology, the growth of the serv­
ice sector in American business, and the ever increasing competition 
in the international marketplace, American business now finds itself in 
a period of transition comparable only to the Industrial Revolution. 
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American management must now strengthen its industrial organizations to 
remain viable competitors. The experience of Britain's climacteric 
must not be lost. The Japanese have proven to the international com­
munity that an economy can rise from devastation to prosperity in a 
relatively short time. In the shadow of such a feat, American managers 
should be avid students, now that their own protege, Japan, is sur­
passing its teacher. 
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